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I. Introduction
Many ventures involved in the information, communications and
entertainment industries have started to expand their array of offered
services. Technological convergence,' digitization and the ability of
the Internet to handle many different service types within a single
bitstream2 make it possible for companies to offer "quadruple play"
bundles of wireless and wireline telephony, video, and Internet access
services.' Financial and efficiency gains from vertical' and horizontal
integration,' and the search for new revenues to replace declining
6
margins from maturing and newly competitive services, combine to
create robust incentives for carriers to diversify.
1. Technological convergence refers to innovations that make it possible for
ventures to offer a variety of services via a single digital conduit that previously were
offered on a separate, stand-alone basis via different media. For example, an incumbent
telephone company, such as Verizon, offers a combination of telephone, Internet access,
and video services through its fiber optic Fios network. "This ability to dynamically
multiplex data packets from multiple sources contributes to packet-switched networks
being more efficient and economical than circuit-switched networks. Shared network
resources are the principle of network 'convergence' in practice. Voice, video and data
applications like Internet browsing and other applications noted above are now all
packetized and transmitted using the same network transmission facilities." In the Matter
of Connect Am. Fund, WC Docket No. 10-90, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 25 FCC Rcd. 6557, 6684 (2010).
2. "With the convergence of the various modes of communications networks, many
broadband Internet services incorporate wireline and wireless elements." In the Matter of
Framework for Broadband Internet Service, GN Docket No. 10-127, Notice of Inquiry,
25 FCC Rcd. 7866, 7885 (2010).
3. "Digital convergence is generally understood as the elimination of distinctions
between analog communications systems such as broadcast television, cable television, and
telephone networks. Once encoded in digital form, all information is ultimately
interchangeable. This means that networks previously in distinct markets can become
direct competitors. The transformation of local telephone and cable television companies
into competing providers of 'triple-play' bundles of voice telephony, multi-channel video
programming, and high-speed internet access is a canonical example." Keven Werbach,
Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1261-62 (2007).
4. Vertical integration refers to the combination of separate market activities by a
single enterprise. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 21 FCC Rcd. 2503, 2575 (2006).
5. Horizontal integration "is said to take place when two firms at the same stage of
the production process merge to form a single business organization." THE MIT
DICrIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 188 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed., 1992).
6. The FCC's most current statistics (estimated for 2009) confirm a significant
reduction in basic wireline service revenues, offset by an even greater increase in wireless
revenues. Revenues for end user wireline local telephone service provided by all carriers
amounted to $70.142 billion, which is less than the amount these carriers generated in
1998. Trends in Telephone Service, FED. COMMC'N COMM'N, INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH.
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Diversification by ventures typically results in a single company
providing services that fit within more than one regulatory
classification. This frustrates the Federal Communications
Commission's ("FCC") desire to apply a single regulatory category to
services and service providers,' a process the Commission could
achieve when ventures concentrated on one function and offered one
readily identifiable service, such as telephony. Diversification also
obscures the specific reach of the FCC's regulatory wingspan, both in
terms of what regulatory classifications it can apply to which services
and what regulatory safeguards it can lawfully apply.
For example, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Comcast Corp.
v. FCC,' recently reversed the Commission's attempt to subject
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") to regulatory safeguards
identified in Title II of the Communications Act, as amended,' but
which the Commission wanted to apply through "ancillary
jurisdiction"10 under Title I of the Act." The court rejected the FCC's
Div., WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, 15-3 (Sept. 2010), http://www.fcc.gov/Daily-
Releases/DailyBusiness/2010/db0930/DOC-301823A1.pdf. See also Local Telephone
Competition: Status as of December 31, 2008, FED. COMMC'N COMM'N, INDUS. ANALYSIS
& TECH. Div., WIRELINE COMPETITON BUREAU (June 2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/DailyReleases/DailyBusiness/2010/db0625/DOC-299052A1.pdf.
7. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11522-23 (1998)
("The language and legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996] indicate that
the drafters ... regarded telecommunications services and information services as
mutually exclusive categories.").
8. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FCC could
not bar Comcast from interfering with its customers' use of peer-to-peer networking
applications because the Commission failed to show how its claim of jurisdiction was
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities).
9. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2010).
10. The FCC attempted to assert jurisdiction over technologies and services for which
the Communications Act does not provide specific authority. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600
F.3d at 644. The Commission assumed that a broad legislative mandate existed in Title I
of the Communications Act that authorized the Commission to regulate wire and radio
service. Id. at 651. "'Ancillary authority' refers to the Commission's statutory discretion
to adopt measures that are 'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the
Commission's various responsibilities."' Framework for Broadband Internet Service, 25
FCC Rcd. 7866, 7868-69 n.10 (2010) (citing United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157.
178 (1962)). The D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's jurisdictional claim based on a two-part
test: "(1) the Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably
ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities." Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d, at 646, (citing Am. Library Ass'n v.
FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The court determined that the FCC had not
satisfied the second part of the test. "Because the Commission has failed to tie its assertion
of ancillary authority over Comcast's Internet service to any 'statutorily mandated
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attempt to apply such safeguards on ventures classified as information
service providers, a largely unregulated status.1
Following the Comcast reversal, the FCC must rethink how it can
best serve the public interest and safeguard consumers, despite having
broadly applied the information service classification to all Internet
services and ISPs. Already, the FCC has had to find ways to impose
Title 11-type regulatory safeguards on providers of Voice over
Internet Protocol ("VoIP") service." Additionally, the Commission
has avoided making necessary and explicit regulatory classifications
as to which category new services such as VoIP and Internet Protocol
Televisionl4 fit. 15
responsibility,' [citing Am. Library, 406 F.3d at 692], we grant the petition for review and
vacate the Order." Id. at 661.
11. 47 U.S.C. §152(a) (2010).
12. "In this case, the Commission does not claim that Congress has given it express
authority to regulate Comcast's Internet service. Indeed, in its still-binding 2002 Cable
Modem Order, the Commission ruled that cable Internet service is neither a
'telecommunications service' covered by Title II of the Communications Act nor a 'cable
service' covered by Title VI." Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d, at 645 (citing In re High-
Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802
(2002), aff'd, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005)).
13. Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") offers voice communications capabilities,
much like ordinary telephone service, using the packet-switched Internet, for all or part of
the link between the call originator and the call recipient. For VolP service providers that
offer subscribers access to or from conventional wired and wireless telephone networks,
the FCC Interconnected VoIP service providers must contribute to universal service
funding, Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518, 7538 (2006) (extending section 254(d)
permissive authority to require interconnected VolP providers to contribute to the USF),
reh'g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007); reconfigure their service to provide wiretapping capabilities to law
enforcement authorities, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act &
Broadband Access & Servs., First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14989 (2005), petition for review denied, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir.
2006), provide caller location identification and emergency 911 access, IP-Enabled Servs.,
E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, First Report and Order and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 10245 (2005), petition for review denied, 473 F.3d
302 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and offer service to disabled users. IP-Enabled Servs.,
Implementation of Sections 255 and 251(A)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Access to Telecommunications Service,
Telecommunications Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment by Persons with
Disabilities Telecommunications, Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd. 11275 (2007), Order and
Public Notice Seeking Comment, 22 FCC Rcd. 18319 (2007) (granting in part and denying
in part waivers of the FCC order). See generally Vonage Holding Corp. v. The Minn. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 994 (D. Minn. 2003)(upholding FCC preemption of
state VolP regulation).
14. Internet Protocol Television ("IPTV") refers to the ability of Internet access
subscribers to receive and view video content through real-time, immediate delivery of
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Absent a legislative remedy, the FCC has experienced great
difficulty in finding ways to sanction ISP anticompetitive practices
regulations within the Commission's limited statutory authority. FCC
Chairman Julius Genachowski has proposed to reclassify Internet
access as a hybrid Title II regulated service, triggering only a limited
portion of the available regulatory safeguards." Such a re-
classification, following a reversal, would appear as after-the-fact
scrambling to rearrange the wingspan of Title II jurisdiction without
statutory authority.
This article will explain how the FCC has backed itself into a
corner when it sought to free the Internet of most regulatory
oversight by determining that the information service classification
applies to all Internet access technologies such as cable modem
service. Facing complaints about ISP anticompetitive practices, the
packets, also known as streaming, or as files downloaded for subsequent viewing.
Although the FCC has not explicitly classified IPTV, the Commission did determine that
an IPTV provider did not qualify for the status of multichannel video programming
distributor ("MVPD"), which are entitled to seek FCC resolution of a program
access complaint. In the Matter of Sky Angel U.S., LLC, Emergency Petition for
Temporary Standstill, DA 10-679, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879 (2010). Section 548(d) authorizes
any "multichannel video programming distributor aggrieved by conduct that it alleges
constitutes a violation of subsection (b) of this section, or the regulations of the
Commission under subsection (c) of this section, may commence an adjudicatory
proceeding at the Commission." 47 U.S.C. § 548(d) (2010).
15.
The Communications Act, even after its 1996 rewrite, divides the world
into discrete regulatory silos: Title II for telecommunications carriers,
Title III for broadcasters, and Title VI for cable television. It offers
definitional categories, such as 'telecommunications service' and
"information service" that are anachronistic in a world where all
communications is ultimately just bits of data organized in different ways.
Assignment of a service to one of these categories has tremendous
consequences. Yet in a converged world, there is often no good way to
map the categories to reality. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), for
example, is fundamentally both voice and data, straddling the line
between telecommunications and information services.
Werbach, supra note 3, at 1266-67.
16. Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored
Broadband Framework, BROADBAND.GOV (May 6, 2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs
public/attachmatchlDOC-297944A1.doc (proposing to apply Title II regulation only to the
bit transmission portion of ISP services and rejecting a renewed attempt to find a way to
extend Title I ancillary jurisdiction or reclassifying all aspects of Internet access as a
telecommunications service). See also Austin Schlick, FCC General Counsel, A Third-Way
Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma, BROADBAND.GOV (May 6, 2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchlDOC-297945A1.doc (providing legal
rationale for narrow application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority over
Internet access).
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FCC currently lacks explicit statutory authority to provide a needed
remedy. The article also will provide recommendations on how
Congress and the FCC might recognize that convergent services, such
as Internet access, combine both unregulated information service and
telecommunications components in much the same way as wireless
cellular telephone companies, which offer both regulated common
carrier telephone calling coupled with a variety of unregulated
information services using the same transmission link.
The article recommends that in light of the ascending importance
of Internet access and the lack of sustainable competition that would
foster effective self-regulation, Congress should amend the
Communications Act to authorize the FCC to apply limited Title II
safeguards to ISPs the already wireless telephony. Considering the
failure of Congress to reach a consensus, the article suggests that the
FCC safeguard consumers when ISPs cause harm as the Commission
did when a DSL service provider blocked access to competing VoIP
*17services.
II. One Size No Longer Fits All
Technological innovations make it feasible for telecom-
munications ventures to diversify into other lines of business.
Through vertical and horizontal integration-often expedited by
mergers-firms can exploit technological convergence to provide
consumers with a "one-stop shop" for an increasingly diverse array of
information, communications, and entertainment ("ICE") services.
ICE firms can use the Internet as a single medium for the delivery of
many services that they could not previously offer due to
technological limitations, or that they offered only on a discrete,
standalone basis. Such marketplace convergence rewards firms with
gains in efficiency and productivity when they bundle many services
into a "triple" or "quadruple-play" of wired and wireless telephone
service, Internet access, and video programming.
17. See Madison River Commc'n, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 (2005)(agreeing to a
$15,000 monetary forfeiture and consent decree agreeing not to block Digital Subscriber
Link ("DSL") customers' access to Voice over the Internet Protocol telephone services).
18. "Bouygues Telecom offers its 'Ideo' service, which is a quadruple-play package.
For the equivalent of $54 per month, subscribers receive Internet, TV, fixed telephone and
mobile phone connections." In the Matter of International Comparison Requirements
Pursuant to the Broadband Data Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 09-47 International
Broadband Data Report, DA10-1348, First Report, 2010 WL 3425286, *13 (West
pagination)(rel. Aug. 27, 2010).** Also available at: http://www.fcc.gov/DailyReleases/
Daily-Business/2010/db0827/DA-10-1348A1.pdf.
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Marketplace convergence presents the FCC with an acute
quandary because the Commission has customarily applied a single
regulatory classification to all of the services offered by a company.
With technological convergence providing the wherewithal for
ventures to offer a wide variety of ICE services, the Commission
cannot shoehorn everything 9 offered by a company into one of the
mutually exclusive classifications Congress has created for the
Commission to apply.20 Telephone companies, which previously only
provided telecommunications services, now offer Internet access, and
video services. Likewise, cable television companies, which solely
provided video services, now offer Internet access and telephone
services. Cellular telephone companies seamlessly combine
telecommunications, information and video services, via
"smartphones" that increasingly offer the functionality of both
television sets and computers. With compression and digitization of
their signals, television broadcasters soon may offer Internet access
and other wireless services.
19.
The impending shift of all networks to packet-switched technologies
promises to complete the collapse of any remaining attempt to base
regulation on differences in the means of transmission. Once all
communications are reduced to bits and bytes, all media will constitute
substitutes for one another, and attempts to segment markets based on
the means of conveyance will become increasingly problematic.
Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation & Interagency Governance, 2003 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 701, 714.
20. The three major statutory service categories established in the Communications
Act are telecommunications service, information service, and cable service.
Telecommunications service refers to "the offering of telecommunications for a fee
directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the
public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. §153(46) (2010). Telecommunications
"means the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received." 47 U.S.C. §153(43). Information service refers to "the offering of a capability
for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does
not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service." 47
U.S.C. §153(20). Cable service means "(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i)
video programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if
any, which is required for the selection or use of such video programming or other
programming service." 47 U.S.C. §522(6)(A)-(B) (2010).
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A. An Either/Or Regulatory Dichotomy Does Not Work for Convergent
Services
Nothing forecloses the FCC from applying two or more
regulatory classifications to a single venture that provides services in
multiple categories. The growing number of mergers and acquisitions
in the ICE industry2' shows that companies recognize the need to
diversify through vertical and horizontal integration. However, the
FCC appears unable to adjust its regulatory regime in response to
such diversification, largely because the statutory definitions the
Commission must apply no longer establish clear and appropriate
distinctions as to which significantly different regulatory regimes
apply.
Until now, the FCC has been able to erect "regulatory silos"22 and
to assign individual companies into one, and only one, of these
classifications. The Commission increasingly finds that it cannot
readily assign only one classification. Instead of admitting this and
seeking legislative remedies, the Commission strives to stretch the
existing legislative categories to apply to convergent services. This
strategy has not always worked. For example, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the Commission's attempt to apply some Title II
regulatory requirements to ISPs, because explicit statutory language
limits such common carrier regulations to telecommunications service
providers."
In other instances, the FCC has been able to stretch regulatory
classifications or apply multiple classifications without explicitly
acknowledging that it has done so, even when no statutory
prohibition on the practice exists. For example, the Commission
21. The FCC's website provides more information on pending and recent major
mergers subject to FCC approval. Transaction Team, FCC OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL, http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
22.
Under this framework, the appropriate regulation depends not on the
function of the service, but on the label the FCC chooses to apply to the
provider or to the network infrastructure over which service is provided.
In fact, the FCC often regulates identical services differently if the
providers or infrastructure have different 'labels' (e.g., wireline
telephone voice service falls within Title II, while wireless voice service
over radio spectrum falls within Title III). As the below diagram
illustrates, this traditional approach creates vertical regulatory 'silos.'
John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory of the FCC's
Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 585,591 (2009).
23. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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acknowledges that cellular telephone companies qualify for
streamlined regulation of their common carrier telecommunications
services24 and also qualify for a deregulatory "safe harbor" when they
offer wireless information services such as broadband access." Over
time, the information service classification appears to have
predominated, in light of the Commission's predilection for applying
just one classification and the view that the wireless marketplace is so
competitive that traditional Title II common carrier consumer
safeguards are unnecessary.2 6
Having largely ignored the fact that cellular telephone companies
still provide telecommunications services, the Commission has opted
24. Framework for Broadband Internet Service, 25 FCC Rcd. 7866, 7877 (2010).
In 1993, CMRS services were still nascent, and Congress specified in a
new section 332(c)(1)(A) of the Communications Act that although Title
II applies to CMRS, the Commission may forbear from enforcing any
provision of the title other than sections 201, 202, and 208. After
Congress gave the Commission broader forbearance authority in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Commission considered a petition
to forbear from sections 201 and 202 as applied to certain CMRS
services. The Commission rejected that forbearance request, finding that
even in a competitive market those provisions are critical to protecting
consumers.
Id.
25. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5930 (2007).
26. Until its most recent analysis, the FCC unconditionally concluded that the
wireless radiotelephone industry was robustly competitive: "U.S. consumers continue to
reap significant benefits-including low prices, new technologies, improved service
quality, and choice among providers-from competition in the [wireless services]
marketplace, both terrestrial and satellite CMRS. The metrics . . . indicate that there is
effective competition in the [wireless services] market and demonstrate the increasingly
significant role that wireless services play in the lives of American consumers."
Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Thirteenth Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 6185, 6189 (2009).
The Commission appears to have backed away from this conclusion: "[R]ather than
reaching an overarching, industry-wide determination with respect to whether there is
'effective competition,' the Report complies with the statutory requirement by providing a
detailed analysis of the state of competition that seeks to identify areas where market
conditions appear to be producing substantial consumer benefits and provides data that
can form the basis for inquiries into whether policy levers could produce superior
outcomes." Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993 Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, FCC 10-81 (2009) [hereinafter 14th Report on the
Wireless Marketplace]. "Since the period covered by the Thirteenth Report, [wireless
services] competition has grown stronger by some of the measures previously considered,
but weaker by others." Id.
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to focus on the information services component by emphasizing that
the hybrid and convergent nature of what these carriers offer justifies
deregulation. As the wireless marketplace becomes highly
concentrated27 , the FCC will lack, or consider itself unable to apply
essential regulatory safeguards, particularly in light of the
Commission's spectrum allocation procedures that favor deep-
pocketed incumbent firms able to bid the highest sums to lock up new
spectrums.x
1. Internet Access
The single regulatory classification preference of the FCC,
combined with concerns about regulatory parity with other
unregulated Internet access options such as cable modem service,
motivated the Commission to change its regulatory classification of
Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") services. 29  Even though the FCC
initially classified DSL as a telecommunications service30 and DSL
27. The FCC has approved numerous market consolidating acquisitions, including
ones by AT&T and Verizon, whose combined share of the national market exceeds sixty
percent. 14th Report on the Wireless Marketplace, supra note 26. See also Applications of
Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless and Atlantis Holdings, 23 FCC Rcd. 17444
(2008) (entailing the Verizon Wireless acquisition of ALLTEL). Note that Verizon sold
to AT&T the wireless properties that Verizon could not retain pursuant to the FCC's
order approving the acquisition. Applications of AT&T Inc. and Cellco Partnership d/b/a
Verizon Wireless, 25 FCC Rcd. 8704 (June 22, 2010).
28. See 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits for
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Report & Order, 16 FCC Rcd. 22668, 22738 (2001)
(eliminating a cap on the amount of radio spectrum any single cellular radiotelephone
carrier can control). In 2008 the FCC auctioned off 62MHz of additional wireless
spectrum made available in the conversion from analog to digital television. Verizon and
AT&T acquired the lion's share of the newly available spectrum. "According to an
analysis by The Associated Press, the two telecom companies [AT&T and Verizon] bid
more than $16 billion, constituting the vast majority of the overall $19.6 billion that was
bid in the FCC auction. With Verizon Wireless and AT&T dominating the auction so
completely, hopes that the auction would allow for the creation of a new nationwide
wireless service provider were dashed." W. David Gardner, Verizon, AT&T Big Winners
in 700 MHz Auction, INFORMATIONWEEK, March 20, 2008, available at http://www.
informationweek.com/news/mobility/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=206905000; see also,
Saul Hansell, Verizon and AT&T Win Big in Auction of Spectrum, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/technology/ 21auction.html; Federal
Communications Commission, Auction 73, 700 MHz Band Fact Sheet, FEDERAL
COMM'NCS COMM'N (last modified Mar. 20, 2008), http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.
htm?job= auction_ factsheet&id=73.
29. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853,
14856 (2005) petition for review denied, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205
(3d. Cir. 2007).
30. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012, 24029-30 (1998).
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constitutes a retrofit of the copper wire initially used exclusively to
provide telephone service, the Commission later applied the
information service classification." The Commission typically accrues
public relations and political benefits when it finds ways to deregulate
and reduce the real or claimed burdens on commercial ventures.
Should the Commission consider re-regulating or increasing
regulations, stakeholders claim that such changes become a burden
on their global competitiveness, ability to create more jobs and
incentives to invest in vital next generation network facilities.
The Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunication
Association v. Brand X deferred to the FCC's expertise in
interpreting statutory definitions.32 The Court afforded the
Commission ample flexibility, which has resulted in expanding the
reach and applicability of the largely unregulated information service
classification to include all types of Internet access.33 The majority
agreed that the Commission could erect a regulatory dichotomy
between ventures using telecommunications as a building block for
information services and those providing telecommunications
services. 34  In the former, the telecommunications component is
provided as part of an integrated package of functions predominated
by information services. In the latter, the telecommunications
component can be separated and considered a stand-alone service.
This somewhat metaphysical distinction results in a substantial
dichotomy of regulatory oversight, with information services subject
to limited FCC oversight, and telecommunications services subject to
substantially more-though possibly reduced if the FCC determines
that the public interest no longer requires such safeguards.
Because the FCC opted to extend the information service
classification to all types of wireline and wireless Internet access, the
31. Id. at 14857.
32. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 102-03
(2005)(affirming the FCC's classification of cable modem delivered Internet access as an
information service).
33. For analysis of the case, see Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and
Information Services Have in Common? Lessons From Recent Judicial and Regulatory
Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247 (2006).
34. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 990-92. See also, Frieden, supra note 33.
35. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853 (2005) (reclassifying DSL as an information service), petition
for review denied, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007); United
Power Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of
Broadband Over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, 21 FCC
Rcd. 13281 (2006)(classifying broadband over powerline as an information service;
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY STRATEGIES 2172011]1
Commission cannot subsequently condition its blanket determination
on grounds that ISPs have the incentive and ability to operate anti-
competitively in certain instances. This is true for two reasons. First,
Congress determined that information services do not require heavy
handed, costly, and possibly investment incentive-robbing
regulation." Second, even if the information service industry has not
evolved into the robustly competitive marketplace that the FCC
predicted, the Commission has made no explicit acknowledgement
that the ISP marketplace lacks the ability to self-regulate.
The Commission cannot intervene to remedy marketplace abuses
when it had previously determined that the industry qualified for
blanket deregulation. In other words, the FCC's decision to apply the
information service classification broadly to all Internet access
options implies that the Commission could not anticipate any instance
where it would have to remedy abuses, or that the Commission could
lawfully backtrack and reinsert elements of Title II regulatory
safeguards if necessary."
Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901 (2007)(classifying wireless broadband as an information
service).
36.
The telecommunications/information services distinction, added in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, codified an earlier FCC-developed
division between basic and enhanced services. In its Computer Inquiry
decisions between the late 1960s and the early 1990s, the FCC wrestled
with the treatment of data-processing services that interacted with the
telephone network . . .. The Commission created a distinction between
basic services, which were traditional, regulated transmission offerings,
and enhanced services, a new invention. ... The Commission limited the
ability of AT&T and its successor companies to offer enhanced services,
so they would not snuff out new services that depended on their
underlying transmission capabilities. The basic/enhanced distinction
became a sort of shorthand for regulated versus unregulated services.
This concept largely survived in the 1996 Act.
Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL. L. REV. 535, 542-43 (2010)(citations
omitted). Similarly, the FCC seeks to insulate information service providers from having
to pay regulatory fees borne by basic telecommunications service providers. "Much of the
rationale behind treating Internet access as an 'information service' has come from the
Commission's attempts to avoid burdening Internet access providers with universal service
fees." Susan Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REv. 871, 899 (2009).
37. "Nonetheless, we articulate principles recognizing the importance of consumer
choice and competition in regard to accessing and using the Internet: the Internet Policy
Statement that we adopt today adopts such principles. We intend to incorporate these
principles into our ongoing policymaking activities. Should we see evidence that providers
of telecommunications for Internet access or IP-enabled services are violating these
principles, we will not hesitate to take action to address that conduct." Appropriate
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In light of instances where DSL or cable modem service
providers, e.g., Madison River Telephone Company" and Comcast,39
have acted on their incentive and ability to operate in an
anticompetitive and discriminatory manner, the Commission has
selectively attempted to impose regulatory safeguards or sanctions.
The FCC tried to extend the reach of ancillary jurisdiction' under
Title I of the Communications Act, so that the Commission could
require information service providers to comply with enforceable
elements of what common carriers have to accept in light of the
Commission's jurisdiction under Title II. Facing a complete rejection
of that strategy, Chairman Julius Genachowski regrouped and came
up with a "third way" reinterpretation of what Internet access
entails.41 The Chairman now identifies telecommunications
components in the transmission of Internet bits and packets, even
though previously the Commission was keen to ignore that function,
or subordinate it as an integrated component in what constitutes an
42information service.
In both instances, the FCC seems to assume that it has
unconditional flexibility to ignore or reinterpret all or part of the
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd.
14853, 14904 (2005).
38. See Madison River Commc'n, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005)(adopting a consent
decree whereby a provider of DSL service agreed to a fifteen thousand dollar forfeiture
and to refrain from blocking subscriber access to Voice over the Internet Protocol
services).
39. Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008), rev'd, Comcast
Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
40. The FCC has had significant success in convincing appellate courts that a claim of
ancillary jurisdiction has a sufficient link to direct statutory authority. For example,
before receiving explicit congressional authority, the Commission launched an extensive
regulatory regime for cable television based on its potential for fragmenting regulated
broadcast television audiences and the ability of broadcasters to offer "free" advertiser
supported programming. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United
States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); but see FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
41. Genachowski, supra note 15 (rejecting a renewed attempt to find a way to extend
Title I ancillary jurisdiction or reclassifying Internet access as a telecommunications
service).
42. Perhaps recognizing the vulnerability of this interpretation, the FCC opted to use
a different primary strategy when formulating enforceable rules in a Report and Order.
See Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191, Report and Order, FCC 10-201
(rel. Dec. 23, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/ attachmatchlFCC-
10-201A1.doc. The Commission views Section 706 of the Communications Act as a
mandate for regulatory safeguards, despite language that only authorizes the Commission
to promote access to advanced telecommunications capability. 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2010).
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regulatory limitations that flow from the application of specific
legislative classifications.43 When the FCC opted to apply the
information service classification, it foreclosed the opportunity to use
Title II safeguards, even if the Commission subsequently finds that
the information service marketplace has not become robustly
competitive and effectively self-regulating. The FCC's attempt to
sanction Comcast for interfering with subscribers' peer-to-peer
traffic," absent legitimate network management requirements, failed
to pass muster with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 45 This decision
severely sidetracks the Commission's attempt to establish binding and
lawful network neutrality' policies, rules and regulations absent an
explicit legislative mandate.
43. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Brand X, which affirmed the FCC's classification of
cable modem service as an information service, warned that appellate courts should not
defer to expert regulatory agencies that cleverly secure flexibility to make regulatory or
even deregulatory decisions free of statutory authority:
[W]hat the Commission hath given, the Commission may well take
away-unless it doesn't. This is a wonderful illustration of how an
experienced agency can (with some assistance from credulous courts)
turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic discretions . . . . Under its
undefined and sparingly used "ancillary" powers, the Commission might
conclude that it can order cable companies to "unbundle" the
telecommunications component of cable-modem service. And presto,
Title II will then apply to them, because they will finally be "offering"
telecommunications service! . . . Such Mobius-strip reasoning mocks the
principle that the statute constrains the agency in any meaningful way.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1013-14
(Scalia, J. dissenting)(2005).
44. The FCC describes peer-to-peer ("P2P") traffic as:
P2P applications allow individual computer users to transmit data
directly to another user, without the use of an intermediate network
service. The P2P software and services permit individuals to search the
computers of other participants for the desired content, and individual
members act as hosts, distributing content from their computers. This is a
highly decentralized system of content distribution.
Implementation of the Child Safe Viewing Act: Examination of Parental Control
Technologies for Video or Audio Programming, 24 FCC Rcd. 11413, 11472 1 135 (2009).
45. Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642,661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
46. See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Dan G. Barry, The
Effect of Video Franchising Reform on Net Neutrality: Does the Beginning of IP
Convergence Mean That It Is Time for Net Neutrality Regulation, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 421 (2008); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard,
Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12 J. INTERNET L., No.
6, 1 (2008); Jennifer L. Newman, Keeping the Internet Neutral: Net Neutrality and Its Role
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Noting that the Commission did not invoke express statutory
authority, the D.C. Circuit considered whether "barring Comcast
from interfering with its customers' use of peer-to-peer networking
applications-was 'reasonably ancillary to the . . effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.'47
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's broad deference to the FCC's
assertion of ancillary jurisdiction in Brand X,48 the D.C. Circuit
in Protecting Political Expression on the Internet, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 153
(2008); T. Randolph Beard, Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT L.J. 149 (2007); Jerry Brito, A Tale of Two Commissions: Net Neutrality
and Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2007); Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0:
Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network Neutrality Debate, 1 INT'L J. OF
COMM., 461 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network Neutrality or Bias?-Handicapping the Odds
for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., No. 2, 171 (2007);
Brett Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Yoo's Frame and What It Ignores: Network
Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Superhighway, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383
(2007); Tim Wu and Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral? Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007); Robert E. Litan, Unintended
Consequences of Net Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 533 (2007);
Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital
Age, I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 197 (2007); Amit M. Schejter, "Justice, and Only
Justice, You Shall Pursue": Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls's
Theory of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137 (2007); Howard A.
Shelanski, Network Neutrality: Regulating with More Questions Than Answers, 6 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2007); Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network
Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free Speech and the Postal System, 33
N. KY. L. REV. 483 (2006); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006); Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of
Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 103 (Dec. 2006); William G. Laxton,
Jr., The End of Net Neutrality, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15 (2006); Lawrence Lessig,
In Support of Network Neutrality, I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 185 (2007); J.
Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the
Internet, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON., No. 3, 349 (2006); Adam Thierer, Are "Dumb Pipe"
Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network
Layers Model, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005); Tim Wu, Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2005),
Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. (2005);
Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 23 (2004); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
47. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 644 (quoting Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689,
692 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
48. The D.C. Circuit does not interpret the Brand X case as precedent for the
imposition of plenary authority over any matter involving cable television company
provided Internet access. "By leaping from Brand X's observation that the Commission's
ancillary authority may allow it to impose some kinds of obligations on cable Internet
providers to a claim of plenary authority over such providers, the Commission runs afoul
of Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I." Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 650. "The
Commission's exercise of ancillary authority over Comcast's network management
practices must . . . 'be independently justified."' Id. at 651 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of
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required evidence that the FCC's regulatory action had a direct link
to its statutorily mandated responsibilities." The court vacated the
FCC's sanctioning order on Comcast based on the view that the FCC
relied on congressional statements of policy that do not provide a
precedent for creating such responsibilities and on various section of
the Communications Act that the court deemed inapplicable for
substantive and procedural reasons.
The D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's reprimand of
Comcast based on the court's refusal to accept the Commission's
claim of ancillary jurisdiction."o The court referred to the three major
cable television cases" where the Supreme Court had affirmed the
FCC's ancillary jurisdictional claim "at a time when, as with the
Internet today, the Communications Act gave the Commission no
express authority to regulate such systems."52 As in the case rejecting
the FCC's attempt to require television set manufacturers to build
units capable of processing digital rights management "broadcast
flags," the court distilled the precedent for ancillary jurisdiction
established by these cases into a two-part test: whether "(1) the
Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject or (2) the
regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective
performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities."" The court
determined that the FCC had not satisfied the second part of the
test.54
Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1976))(rejecting the
FCC's preemption of state and local regulation of two-way, intrastate, non-video cable
transmissions).
49. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 648. "The Commission therefore rests its assertion of
authority over Comcast's network management practices on the broad language of section
4(i) of the Act: 'The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary
in the execution of its functions."' Id. at 645 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 154(i)); Formal Complaint
of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-
Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13036 (2008)).
50. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 644.
51. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
52. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 646.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 644.
The Commission may exercise this 'ancillary' authority only if it
demonstrates that its action-here barring Comcast from interfering with
its customers' use of peer-to-peer networking applications-is 'reasonably
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In a series of references to provisions of the Communications
Act," the Commission expansively read congressional policy as
sufficient ground for enacting ISP regulations." The D.C. Circuit
flatly rejected the FCC's attempt to infer congressional intent in order
for the Commission to extend its regulatory wingspan to include
Internet access:
[T]he Commission maintains that congressional policy by
itself creates "statutorily mandated responsibilities" sufficient
to support the exercise of section 4(i) ancillary authority. Not
only is this argument flatly inconsistent with Southwestern
Cable, Midwest Video I, Midwest Video II, and NARUC II,
but if accepted it would virtually free the Commission from its
congressional tether."
The court concluded that if it accepted the FCC's theory of
ancillary authority, the Commission could invoke that theory to apply
any number of regulatory requirements to cable modem provided
Internet access without explicit congressional authority. 8
2. Voice Over Internet Protocol
Even though the FCC finds it legally impossible to re-regulate
Internet access, either by stretching its interpretation of Title I, or by
inserting selected elements of Title II onto information services, or by
ancillary to the . . . effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities.'
Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Commission has failed
to make that showing. It relies principally on several Congressional statements of policy,
but under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit case law statements of policy, by themselves,
do not create "statutorily mandated responsibilities." The Commission also relies on
various provisions of the Communications Act that do create such responsibilities, but for
a variety of substantive and procedural reasons those provisions cannot support its
exercise of ancillary authority over Comcast's network management practices. We
therefore grant Comcast's petition for review and vacate the challenged order. Comcast
Corp., 600 F.3d at 644.
55. The Commission cited to Secs. 1, 230(b), 706, 257, 201 and 623 of the
Communications Act.
56. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 655.
57. Id.
58. Id. ("Were we to accept that theory of ancillary authority, we see no reason why
the Commission would have to stop [at imposing regulation of Internet Service Providers'
rates] for we can think of few examples of regulations that apply to Title II common
carrier services, Title III broadcast services, or Title VI cable services that the
Commission, relying on the broad policies articulated in section 230(b) and section 1,
would be unable to impose upon Internet service providers.").
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inferring congressional authorization where no explicit language
exists, the Commission has found ways to regulate VoIP.
Notwithstanding the fact that VolP services apply software to
Internet access links, such as DSL that are already classified as
information services,59 the Commission has managed to apply Title II
safeguards without having to specify into which category commercial
VoIP service fits.W The Commission only specified that personal
computer-to-personal computer VoIP clearly falls into the
information service category." In a report to the Senate, the
Commission also tentatively concluded that VolP calls, which have
access to and from the conventional Public Switched Telephone
Network ("PSTN"), constitute a telecommunications service.62
However, the FCC never made an on-the-record determination for
these interconnected services, possibly because having to do so would
result in the anomalous outcome of the Commission determining that
basic bit transmission services provided by ISPs qualify as
59. A VoIP service uses software to configure voice bits into a telephone service.
Because the FCC has determined that bit transmission service constitutes an information
service, the Commission could not credibly determine that the software configuration of
bits also constitute an information service. See Rob Frieden, Assessing the Merits of
Network Neutrality Obligations at Low, Medium and High Network Layers, 115 PENN. ST.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
60. VolP service providers accessible to and from conventional wired or wireless
networks must contribute to universal service funding. Universal Serv. Contribution
Methodology, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518, 7538 (2006) (extending section 254(d) permissive
authority to require interconnected VolP providers to contribute to the USF), petition for
review denied, vacated in part on other grounds, Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007). VolP providers must reconfigure their services to provide
wiretapping capabilities to law enforcement authorities. Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access & Servs., 20 FCC Rcd. 14989, 14989 (2005),
petition for review denied, Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
They must provide caller location identification and emergency 911 access. IP-Enabled
Servs., E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers, 20 FCC Rcd. 10245, 10246
(2005), petition for review denied, Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
They must offer subscribers the option of transferring the telephone number they
previously used. Telephone Number Requirements for IP-Enabled Services Providers, 22
FCC Red. 19531, 19532 (2007). They also must offer service to disabled users. IP-Enabled
Servs., Implementation of Sections 255 and 251(A)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934,
as Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Access to Telecommunications
Service, Telecommunications Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment by Persons
with Disabilities Telecommunications, 22 FCC Rcd, 11275, 11276 (2007), Order and Public
Notice Seeking Comment, 22 FCC Rcd. 18319, 18319 (2007)(granting in part and denying
in part waivers of the FCC order).
61. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither
Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, 19 FCC Rcd. 3307, 3324 (2004).
62. Fed.-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11528 (1998).
224 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [33:2
information services, but software configured services that ride on top
of the bit transmission stream do not.
Nevertheless, courts have validated the FCC's preemption of state
regulatory jurisdiction,63 and have not rejected as unlawful the
Commission's selective application of Title II safeguards on VoIP
ventures based on the view that such services have a sufficiently close
statutory link to common carriage telephony.' Because VoIP
constitutes the functional equivalent of Title II telephone service,
provided by powerful incumbent firms, the Commission can impose
regulatory safeguards that may protect consumers but also have a
direct and negative monetary impact on VoIP providers, including
thinly capitalized market entrants. Remarkably, when confronted
with a similar instance of functional equivalence-Internet Protocol
Television ("IPTV")"-the Commission has so far refrained from
making a regulatory call. In the absence of such decision making, the
FCC de facto treats IPTV as an information service, even though it
offers identical or similar video programming as offered by cable
television operators.
B. The FCC Has Abandoned the Most Effective and Straightforward
Safeguards
The FCC would not have to finesse its interpretation of statutory
service definitions if it had continued to require structural or
functional separation of telecommunications services from everything
else offered by ICE ventures." At the onset of data communications,
the Commission's first regulatory strategy explicitly limited oversight
63. Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an
Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 19 FCC Rcd. 22404, 22413 (2004)
(classifying Vonage's VoIP offering as a "jurisdictionally mixed service" and expressly
preempting the Minnesota Commission's regulation of that service), aff'd on other
grounds, Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570 (8th Cit. 2007).
64. See, e.g., Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2007)(FCC
could lawfully require VoIP service providers, which receive or deliver calls to
conventional wired and wireless networks, to contribute to a universal service fund).
65. For background on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The Regulatory Classification of
Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal Communications Commission Should
Abstain From Cable Service Regulation and Promote Broadband Deployment, 18
COMMLAW CONSPEC'US 199 (2009).
66. Robert W. Crandall, Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Robert E. Litan, Vertical Separation
of Telecommunications Networks: Evidence From Five Countries, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 493.
495 (2010)("[R]egulators may force full structural separation, or complete divestiture, of
the bottleneck facilities into a separate firm. In between, there is a potentially infinite
range of "operational" or "functional" separation alternatives which impose various
requirements for "arms-length" dealing, while stopping short of complete divestiture.").
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to core, basic telecommunications services by requiring carriers to
form separate corporate subsidiaries when pursuing new information
markets. 67 Telephone companies have ample experience in creating
separate subsidiaries, and gladly pursue this option when doing so
possibly insulates revenues. For example, wireline telephone
companies created separate and unregulated telephone directory
publishing companies with an eye toward insulating revenues from
state and federal telecommunications regulation of rates.
Incumbent telephone companies objected to the structural
separation requirement on grounds that it triggered inefficiency, lost
synergies, and higher costs. Although these companies never
provided empirical evidence that such adverse outcomes were
occurring, the FCC accepted their assertions without question and
abandoned structural safeguards.' The Commission adopted some
accounting safeguards, but subsequently abandoned most of these
requirements as well.69 Ironically, just as carriers in the United States
succeeded at persuading the FCC to abandon structural safeguards,
national regulatory authorities in other nations, including the
European Union led by the United Kingdom,70 Australia," and New
67. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Final
Decision, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 385 (1980). See also Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C. 2d 50,
55-56 (1980); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations,
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C. 2d 512, 513
(1981), aff'd, Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Robert
M. Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the Communications/Information
Processing Terrain, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 55 (1981).
68. See Robert M. Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma,
38 FED. COMM. L. J. 383, 384 (1987).
69. See Michael H. Ryan, Structural Separation: A Prerequisite for Effective Telecoms
Competition, 24(6) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 241 (2003); David Gabel, Why is There So
Little Competition in the Provision of Local Telecommunications Services?: An
Examination of Alternative Approaches to End-User Access, 2002 MICH. ST. L. REV. 651;
T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Why ADCo? Why Now? An
Economic Exploration into the Future of Industry Structure for the "Last Mile" in Local
Telecommunications Markets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 421 (2002).
70. See A New Regulatory Approach for Fixed Telecommunications, OFCOM (June
26, 2005), http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2005/06/23/a-new-regulatory-approach-for-fixed-
telecommunications/; Ofcom Accepts Undertakings from Board of BT Group Plc on
Operational Separation, OFCOM (Sept. 22, 2005), http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2005/09/
22/ofcom-accepts-undertakings-from-board-of-bt-group-plc-on-operational-separation/
(announcing the structural changes whereby the dominant incumbent carrier British
Telecom agrees to only offer wholesale services through a structurally separate entity
called Openreach). "[O]perational separation within BT ... would ensure that those
responsible for overseeing BT's bottleneck assets had real incentives to wish to serve other
operators in practice and on the ground with the same zeal, efficiency and enthusiasm as
they served the remainder of BT's downstream activities." Telecommunications Statement,
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Zealand7 2 implemented either structural or functional separation
requirements.7 ' These nations have identified no significant loss of
synergies, or the inability of carriers to decouple telecommunications
elements of convergence services.
Ideally, Congress should reinstate the structural separation
requirement for carriers possessing market power in
telecommunications services markets. By mandating separation,
Congress would obligate carriers offering telecommunications
transmission services, whether for voice or data, to offer such basic
capacity to former affiliates and competitors alike on fair terms and
conditions. In the absence of proof that separation causes the
reduction of synergistic benefits, Congress should act to capture
public welfare gains, such as certainty that facilities-based carriers will
operate in a transparent and nondiscriminatory manner when they
offer bit transmission services to other ventures that add value to such
links.
III. Causes of the FCC's Inability to Calibrate Its Regulatory
Mission
Absent a revised statutory mandate to require structural or
functional separation of basic telecommunication from enhanced
information services, the FCC will continue to muddle through with
ad hoc determinations of which single category convergent services
must fit. The Commission will likely continue to prefer use of the
information service classification, because announcing a deregulatory
outcome typically confers more political benefits than one calling for
regulation.
A. The FCC's Deregulatory Bias
The FCC's appellate court record, instances of substantial shifts in
policy, the failure to subject findings to third-party peer review,
obvious defects in data collection, statistical reporting, and other
flaws demonstrate an administrative agency inclined to engage in
OFCOM 3 (Sept. 8, 2005), http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/
telecoms p2/statement/main.pdf.
71. See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK:
REGULATORY REFORM FOR 21ST CENTURY BROADBAND 20-23 (April 2009),
http://www.dbcde.gov.au/_data/assets/pdf file/0006/110013/NBN RegulatoryReformfo
r _the_21stCenturyBroadbandlow-resweb.pdf.
72. See Telecommunications Amendment Act 2006, No. 83 (N.Z.).
73. See Ricardo Goncalves and Alvaro Nascimento, The Momentum for Network
Separation: A Guide for Regulators, 34 TELECOM. POL'Y 355 (2010).
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results-driven decision making.74 Rather than have an open mind
shaped by the evidence it acquires, the FCC may seek to shape the
record to support a preordained outcome, typically one that reduces
regulations based on a finding of ample and sustainable competition.
Practitioners and academics alike rely heavily on the FCC's data
collections and statistical compilations. When the FCC uses statistics
to support a preconceived objective, the Commission fails to comply
with its statutory mandate to generate a complete and unbiased
evidentiary record, and it violates the Administrative Procedure
Act." The subsequent decisions may fail to pass muster with
reviewing courts," and the primary source of information used for
both applied and academic research may offer a false or incomplete
picture. Far too often, it appears that political expediency and
philosophical commitments tempt Commission managers to shape the
data collection process and subsequent interpretation in ways that
support a desired outcome. For example, if the FCC wants to
conclude that a specific telecommunications market is robustly
competitive, that a proposed merger will serve the public interest, or
that the United States has near ubiquitous broadband access, the
Commission staff bears the burden of generating definitions and
benchmarks, compiling data, reporting statistics, and providing
interpretations that support such conclusions.
When such results-driven data collection and statistical reporting
occur, the corresponding Commission rules, policies, and regulations
become flawed products that may not serve the public interest or may
not reflect a true empirical record. Stakeholders can rely on such
74. See Rob Frieden, Case Studies in Abandoned Empiricism and the Lack of Peer
Review at the Federal Communications Commission, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
277 (2010)(providing examples of FCC decisions overturned by appellate courts or
subsequently abandoned by the Commission).
75. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 434-35 (3d Cir. 2004)
(rejecting the FCC's simple count of media outlets without consideration of market
penetration), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1123, 125 S. Ct. 2902 (2004).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2002)(mandating reviewing courts to set aside agency conclusions
found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law").
76. See, e.g., Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 570 F.3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding failure
to use consistent model for assessing facilities-based competition); Comcast Corp. v. FCC,
579 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009)(rejecting the Commission's rationale for imposing a thirty
percent ownership cap on single cable television operators); Prometheus Radio Project v.
FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 415 (3d Cir. 2004)(partially reversing the FCC based on flawed
modeling of media competition) cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1123 (2004); Qwest Corp. v. FCC,
258 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2001)(determining that the FCC failed to provide
adequate justifications to prove rational decision making in calculating subsidy mechanism
for promoting universal service in high cost areas).
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flawed data to corroborate preferred outcomes in ways that help
legitimize, as "empirically-based," conclusions that would not pass
peer review.
The statutory prohibition of arbitrary and capricious decision
making" obligates the FCC to compile a complete evidentiary record.
Nonetheless, reviewing courts have admonished the Commission for
acquiring and interpreting data selectively with an eye toward
generating statistics that support pre-determined outcomes.7 ' This
results-driven decision making also occurs when the FCC too
willingly accepts stakeholders' requests that the Commission treat
data reports as trade secrets and to redact, sanitize, and obscure
them.79
1. Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics
The FCC has undertaken an aggressive deregulatory campaign
based on its assumptions and statistical compilations that support an
inference of robust competition, affordable prices, and near
ubiquitous access in just about every market, with the exception of
broadband for specific groups of beneficiaries. 0 Even advocates for
deregulation regularly cite the Commission's statistics as evidence
that the unfettered marketplace can largely self-regulate and
accommodate any market consolidation including horizontal mergers
where the acquiring firm buys market share. Both the Commission
and many stakeholders assume that the frequently cited statistics
present a true picture of the marketplace.
The FCC has repeatedly deemed competitive the wireless
marketplace that grows increasingly concentrated in light of the
mergers approved by the Commission, despite proof that the market
already exceeds the Herfandal Hershman Index rating for a highly
77. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
78. See e.g., Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 570 F.3d at 304-305; Comcast Corp. v. FCC,
579 F.3d at 8; Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d at 415; Qwest Corp. v. FCC,
258 F.3d at 1198-99.
79. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.457, 0.459, 1.7001(d), 43.11(c); Report and Order, Examination
of the Current Policy Concerning the Treatment of Confidential Information Submitted to
the Commission, 13 FCC Rcd. 24816, 24883, $ 23 (1998).
80. The Commission readily acknowledges the absence of ubiquitous telephone
service perhaps because a $7.4 billion annual subsidy program exists to subsidize access.
See Universal Service Fund Facts, UNIVERSAL SERVICE FUND ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPANY, (last modified June 16, 2010), http://www.usac.org/about/universal-
service/fund-facts/fund-facts.aspx (showing that $4.3 billion was appropriated for carriers
operating in high cost areas and one billion dollars for subsidizing access by low-income
subscribers).
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concentrated market." Until recent improvements, the Commission's
benchmarking process generated numerous reports that attributed a
number of broadband service options as though anyone within a ZIP
code territory had access to that number of options.' Although it
recently identified that up to twenty-four million Americans lacked
any broadband option," the Commission previously concluded that
84
more than ninety-five percent of all U.S. residents had such access.
The Commission initially stated that statistics proved pay-per-
channel, d la carte access to cable television programming, would not
save consumers money when compared to a packaged bundle of
channels." However, the Commission subsequently reversed itself
with relatively limited explanation for its change in findings.' The
Commission also erected a media diversity index that made no
distinction between media outlets based on market penetration to
support relaxation of a cap on media ownership that a reviewing
81. See 14th Report on the Wireless Marketplace, supra note 24, at 31, Table 3, Chart 1.
82. See Number of Holding Companies Reporting High-Speed Subscribers by ZIP
Code as of June 30, 2007, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, (March 24, 2008), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/hzipO6O.pdf.
83. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Sixth Broadband
Deployment Report, FCC 10-129 (July 20, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.
gov/edocs-public/attachmatchlFCC-10-129A1.doc.
84. "The presence of high-speed service subscribers was reported in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands, and in over 99% of the Zip Codes in the United States."
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU,
HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2007, 1 (March
2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-280906A1.pdf.
See also Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, Fifth Broadband
Deployment Report, FCC 08-88 (June 12, 2008), available at http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatchlFCC-08-88A1.doc.
85. Report on the Packaging and Sale of Video Programming Services to the Public,
FED. COMMC'N COMM'N (2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC.
254432A1.pdf.
86. Further Report on the Packaging and Sale of Video Programming Services to the
Public, FED. COMMC'NSCOMMC'NS (2006), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attach
match/ DOC-263740A1.pdf. See also Charles B. Goldfarb. Congressional Research
Service, THE FCC'S "A LA CARTE" REPORTS (March 30, 2006), http://www.ncta.com/
DocumentBinary.aspx?id=294.
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court rejected based on the lack of supporting evidence." Only after
a stinging judicial rebuke did the FCC consider subjecting its
statistical analysis and modeling to external review from unaffiliated
experts, rather than simply rely on the research and findings
sponsored by stakeholders with a financial interest in the
Commission's decisions.
Until the FCC in 2009 sought to use better calibrated measures of
broadband access in the U.S., the Commission reported statistics that
confirmed a "mission accomplished" view that an unregulated
marketplace operated without failure even for the nation's large rural
hinterland." Skeptical analysts of the FCC's conclusions could not
subject the statistics to comprehensive review because the
Commission agreed to treat as confidential trade secrets the raw
information submitted to the FCC in compliance with a congressional
mandate for accurate tracking of broadband market penetration by
the Commission. 9 Access to such data might provide the basis for
challenging the FCC's optimistic statistical interpretations, because
carriers can obscure their lack of success in providing ubiquitous
broadband access. Ironically, some carriers that willingly display
maps touting the geographical reach of their wireless services argue
against the FCC providing the same information about broadband
penetration to the public.
87. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 415 (3d Cir. 2004)(partially
reversing the FCC based on flawed modeling of media competition), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
1123 (2004).
88. "[W]e find, pursuant to the analytical framework established in prior section 706
reports, that advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans
in a reasonable and timely fashion." In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning the Deployment
of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and
Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act Of 1996, GN Docket No. 07-45, Fifth Report, 23 FCC
Rcd. 9615, 9616 (2008). The Commission reported that as of 2009, nearly one hundred
million Americans lack broadband at home and between fourteen million and twenty-four
million Americans do not have access to broadband even if they want it. In the Matter of
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended
by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, GN Docket No. 09-137, Sixth Broadband
Deployment Report, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9557 (2010).
89. In Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1996, codified at 47 U.S.C. §
1302(b) (2009), Congress directed the Commission and the states to encourage the
deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans. In conjunction
with this objective, Congress instructed the Commission to conduct regular inquiries
regarding the availability of advanced telecommunications capability. Nevertheless, a
federal district court affirmed the Commission's trade secret designation. Ctr. for Pub.
Integrity v. FCC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 106, 117 (D.D.C. 2007).
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The above examples show that some of the FCC's statistical work
product appears to support a preordained result, rather than reflect
an open mind keen on acquiring data to answer questions. The
FCC's data does not help empirical researchers when the Commission
engages in results-driven data acquisition. Researchers want to
acquire statistics to answer questions about the competitiveness of a
particular market. Data framed in a way to justify merger approvals,
to show Congress how competitive a market has become, to provide
the basis for challenging unfavorable statistics compiled by others,
and to support a political or philosophical agenda do not assist
empirical researchers. Rather, it provides a pseudo-scientific basis for
an outcome, one that generally would not pass peer review and might
not pass muster with a reviewing court unwilling to defer to agency
expertise on anything complex and technical.
B. The Commission Can and Should Do a Better Job of Compiling
Statistics
The FCC frequently perceives congressional and public relations
benefits in forecasting the best case scenario for a deregulatory
decision or merger approval. Congressional oversight hearings,
including those that determine the Commission's budget, have a
friendlier tone when FCC representatives report positive news and
statistics. When the Commission has to acknowledge market
domination, market failure, or the lack of competition, it risks losing
such a positive reception, even if regulation or merger disapprovals
would serve the public interest.
Imposing regulation, slowing down the speed of deregulation, and
taking steps to remedy market failure may constitute the right policy
outcome, but it can trigger retaliation. Such retaliation may arise
particularly from incumbent firms that have the resources to act on
their frustration in ways that can punish individual Commissioners
and the FCC collectively. With millions of dollars available to
support deregulatory advocacy, incumbent firms have the financial
wherewithal to frame the debate so that the best case, most
competitive scenario appears real, not just plausible. FCC managers
pragmatically realize that deviating from this party line risks
congressional and major stakeholder displeasure, but that is what
FCC managers and staff may have to do when the public interest
necessitates an independent, open-minded review. The following
concrete recommendations identify some of the macro-level reforms
that the FCC should embrace.
232 [33:2
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY STRATEGIES
1. Refuse to Grant Blanket Trade Secret/Confidentiality Requests From
Stakeholders
Lacking the resources to indepently compile much data about the
industries it regulates, the FCC relies on compulsory reports filed by
specific companies. Stakeholders in the outcome of Commission
proceedings do not want the reports they file to be used in ways that
block, delay, or complicate deregulatory objectives. Unsurprisingly,
companies that bear reporting obligations want to limit the nature
and scope of such duties. When obligated to file reports, these
stakeholders usually seek confidentiality and trade secret protection,
even though such classification can and does limit the utility of the
data.
For example, the FCC has accepted as a trade secret the decision
by an ISP not to serve a particular area.' The Commission dutifully
obscures the identity of ISPs serving a ZIP code. For many years,
researches could only glean from the Commission's data a single
number per ZIP code, ostensibly representing the number of ISPs
available to provide broadband competition everywhere within the
ZIP code territory. The Commission could have challenged the
stakeholders' trade secret claims, in light of a statutory mandate
under Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to
encourage the deployment, on a reasonable and timely basis, of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans and to
initiate a Notice of Inquiry to determine the availability of such
services.9' Trade secrets typically guard against disclosure of a
company's crown jewels-e.g., food and beverage recipes-not a
decision to refrain from serving a locality. Arguably, an ISP's
decision not to provide service identifies an area where the
Commission and other state and federal agencies may have to take
steps to remedy market failure and promote broadband development
consistent with the mandate in Section 706 of the Communications
Act. The FCC, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, Department of Agriculture, and other federal
agencies, along with academic researchers, should have access to the
FCC's collected data, with sufficient granularity to know whether and
where market failures exist.
90. Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (upholding the FCC's trade secret
classification of broadband market penetration data).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2008).
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Accordingly, the Commission should not automatically grant
confidentiality and other requests that obscure, sanitize, and reduce
the utility of the data the Commission collects.
2. Resolve to Compile Understandable, Credible, Granular, and
Reproducible Statistics Based on Reasonable Benchmarks
Researchers and Commission staff need data collection and
statistical compilations that answer basic questions, such as whether a
particular market is competitive, what market share a particular
venture possesses, whether ventures frequently change prices and
diversify services, how ventures respond to consumers' wants, needs,
and desires, and what are the consequences of a Commission-initiated
change in policy, or one proposed by stakeholders. The
Commission's statistical reports typically do not answer such
questions, and researchers must attempt to extrapolate from the data
presented.
For example, the Commission has abandoned requiring
incumbent carriers to separate and offer for lease to competitors the
facilities that switch and route telecommunications traffic,92 despite a
congressional mandate to promote local exchange competition." The
Commission appears to have abandoned these requirements because
the local exchange marketplace has become sufficiently competitive
and market entrants have alternative sources of exchange access-i.e.,
cable television network infrastructure. The Commission also may
have accepted stakeholders' arguments that unbundling requirements
are "confiscatory," a government "taking of property," and a major
disincentive to next generation network investment."
92. Unbundled Access to Network Elements, Review of the Section 251 Unbundling
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 20 FCC Rcd. 2533 (2005).
93. Telecommunications carriers have the
duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the
provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to
network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point
on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252 of this
title. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled
network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine
such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 251(3) (2004).
94. See, e.g., Stuart Buck, TELRIC vs. Universal Service: A Takings Violation?, 56
FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (2003). See also J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRAcr (1998).
[33:2234 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY STRATEGIES
Even though one has to speculate on the Commission's rationale,
a regrettable dearth of data supports any of these deregulatory
justifications. Available Commission statistics count local exchange
lines, and attributes which type of carrier owns or resells these lines.
However, the FCC does not make a clear case that the local exchange
marketplace has become sufficiently competitive, nor does the
Commission provide statistical projections that assess the
sustainability of competition should incumbent carriers no longer
have to provide competitors with unbundled network element access.
Instead the Commission, on nothing more than a hunch, speculates
that local exchange competition will thrive in all sectors including the
"middle mile" links between multiple user locations.
Similarly, on the issue of confiscation and taking, the Commission
could have determined whether incumbent carrier unbundled
network element pricing was sufficiently compensatory. It is
imperative to keep in mind that early in the Commission's campaign
to promote local exchange competition, the Supreme Court noted
that neither the FCC nor any local access-providing carrier had
produced evidence of under-compensation." Some researchers have
argued that FCC regulations remove incentives for carriers to invest
in next generation network plant, particularly local loop unbundling
and other "sharing" requirements.9 6 Has the Commission ever
corroborated this assertion? Recall that local loop unbundling was
not something incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs") gave
away or shared. Resellers and repackagers of local switching and
routing plant paid the incumbents, albeit at a rate below what the
ILECs would like to have been paid. Deep in the FCC's obscure
statistics and data collection process, one can find that compulsory
rentals from incumbents to newcomers peaked at twelve percent of
available line capacity,' a level that is not close to forcing incumbents
to invest in additional plant that they would have to make available
solely to competitors.
95. Verizon Commc'n, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002)(affirming the FCC's
unbundling requirements and pricing methodology for access).
96. See George S. Ford, Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure, and
Convergence, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 331 (2007), Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous
Telecommunications Networks With and Without Mandatory Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J.
477, 492-94 (2006); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling
Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 173 (2005).
97. See Industry Analysis and Technology Division, WIRELINE COMPETITION




The FCC stopped preparing this helpful source of information,
but the percentage of resold ILEC lines has declined below the 8%
reported in 2007, in light of the fact that interconnection charges for
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs") can exceed retail
rates ILECs charge end users, resulting in a price squeeze. However,
this price squeeze is one for which the FCC and the Supreme Court in
Linkline" have no concerns, presumably in light of ample local
exchange service competition.
Assuming that ILECs actually increased their aggregate plant
investment after the FCC abandoned local loop unbundling, did
deregulation cause all of the new investment? Surely the business
cycle has a substantial impact on carriers' investment decisions and
the cost of capital. Declining market share and revenues in core
business lines, such as Plain Old Telephone Service, forced incumbent
telephone companies to diversify and find new revenue generating
lines of business. Whatever disincentive local loop unbundling
imposed paled in comparison to incumbents' need to find new
revenues in light of competitive pressure from VoIP and declining
margins in long distance telephone service. Giving the ILECs due
credit, they have invested in next generation networks, mostly
wireless plant for which no unbundling requirement ever applied. As
to newfound zeal in investing in DSL, ILECs could make relatively
small additional investments in already amortized copper plant to
acquire a share in the growing broadband market.
It should not take an extraordinary amount of research to find
answers to basic questions such as whether incumbent carriers had to
make investments in plant solely to satisfy the demands of reseller
competitors. Similarly, the Commission should consider imperative
the ability to answer these basic questions, such as whether specific
telecommunications markets operate competitively.
3. Seriously Consider the Consequences of Mergers on Consumers
With rare exception, the FCC finds a way to approve any and all
mergers, including those where the acquiring company increases its
market share and further concentrates the market. The Commission
typically asserts that a merger will "promote competition," but
supports this conclusion with a variety of qualitative forecasts about
98. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (holding that
antitrust remedies are not available to offer greater competitive safeguards when the FCC
determines that a carrier has no common carrier obligation to provide access to a
competitor).
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how the acquiring firm will become a better and more efficient
competitor, or that the acquired firm never competed with the
acquiring firm. The Commission's analysis of most mergers
emphasizes the concessions the acquiring firm has "voluntarily"
submitted, rather than assessing the true nature of the
competitiveness of the market in question pre- and post-merger. The
Commission does not conscientiously determine post-merger whether
the acquiring company complies with its offered concessions and
fulfills measureable service commitments.
Consider the wireless marketplace, where FCC-approved mergers
and acquisitions have so concentrated the market that even the
Commission recently has expressed some reservations.
Notwithstanding such concerns, the FCC has approved all
acquisitions, including ones by AT&T and Verizon that now control
over sixty percent of the total market with four national carriers
controlling over ninety-one percent of the market." A researcher
must painstakingly examine almost three hundred pages in the
Commission's most recent Annual Report and Analysis of
Competitive Market Conditions to find the few empirical nuggets
showing that even the Commission now has to conclude that all is not
well in the wireless marketplace.oo
In previous years, the FCC breathlessly endorsed an inference of
robust competition and enhanced consumer welfare, but after
numerous approved mergers, the Commission had to make a passing
reference that the wireless market now has a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index ("HHI") score of 2848, which is well in excess of Department
of Justice antitrust guidelines that considers a market to be "highly
concentrated" if the post-merger HHI exceeds 1800.10o Nowhere in its
comprehensive examination of the wireless marketplace does the
99. 14th Report on the Wireless Marketplace, supra note 24, at 31, Table 3, Chart 1.
100.
[Tihe mobile wireless ecosystem is sufficiently complex that any review
or analysis of competitive market conditions must take into consideration
a multitude of factors. As a result, rather than reaching an overarching,
industry-wide determination with respect to whether there is 'effective
competition,' the Report complies with the statutory requirement by
providing a detailed analysis of the state of competition that seeks to
identify areas where market conditions appear to be producing
substantial consumer benefits and provides data that can form the basis
for inquiries into whether policy levers could produce superior outcomes.
14th Report on the Wireless Marketplace, supra note 24, at f 3.
101. Id. 1 49.
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Commission directly consider the potential consumer harms. The
Commission did not examine wireless carrier pricing to determine if
consciously parallel conduct has occurred, nor did the Commission
consider the question whether robust competition might not exist
even when four or five carriers serve many localities.
4. Commit to Best Practices That Would Survive Peer Review
When an academic researcher seeks to publish work in a credible
journal, external and unaffiliated third-party experts examine the
work without knowing the author's identity. This peer review process
subjects the research to close scrutiny to ensure that the work
complies with baseline standards to assure that the findings are
credible and reproducible by others. Peer review identifies and
legitimizes true research and differentiates it from documents that
simply make assertions, conclusions, and analyses of unproven facts,
statistics, and assumptions.
The Commission's notice and comment process, which solicits
filings from interested parties, provides a forum for both legitimate
research and advocacy documents masquerading as research.
Sponsored researchers submit white papers, affidavits, expert reports,
and other forms of advocacy documents that have a pre-established
agenda and outcome. These documents predominate, because, with
rare exception, only parties with direct financial stakes will commit
the resources needed to participate in Commission proceedings.
Ideally, the FCC should have the resources and incentive to
compile its own evidence, using empirical research tools and best
practices. If that should fail, the Commission should fund third party
research as it has done in preparation of the National Broadband
Plan." The Commission typically relies solely on the filings of
interested parties, which by definition have a biased point of view and
policy agenda. To separate advocacy from empirical data, the FCC
must commit to practices that can distinguish the two. Peer review
can achieve that goal. However, the Commission rarely uses this
process even with the statutory mandate to do so.'o3
The Commission's website showcases very few instances where it
uses peer review, including a 2008 investigation of the Maritime
102. See, e.g., Next Generation Connectivity: A Review of Broadband Internet
Transitions and Policy from Around the World, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET &
Soc. (2009), available at http://www.fcc.gov/stage/pdf/BerkmanCenterBroadband_
Study_130ctO9.pdf.
103. See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 FED. REG. 2664 (Jan.
14, 2005).
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Automatic Identification Systems.'4 In other instances the
Commission relies on third party research but refuses to subject the
research to scrutiny by the general public.o"
Too much is at stake for the FCC not to use the best practices in
its acquisition of data, compilation of statistics, and establishment of
rules, policies, and regulations based on its analysis of statistics. The
Commission should operate under the premise that any rulemaking
must comply with best practices where data is used to justify a policy
initiative.
5. Use Open Hearings and Compile a Complete Evidentiary Record
Over the last thirty years the FCC has all but abandoned use of
hearings before Administrative Law Judges or the Commissioners
themselves. Despite the gains that the FCC has accrued for itself and
its stakeholders in administrative convenience and reduced costs, the
Commission risks losing in terms of the quality of the evidence it
reviews. The final perfunctory hearing and vote by the
Commissioners culminates much behind the scenes maneuvering
often involving ex parte presentations and the brokering of
concessions among major stakeholders. This scenario emphasizes
process over substance with no guarantee of generating a complete
evidentiary record.
The public interest requires the Commission to have an open
mind in its proceedings and to accept rational inferences from the
data collected, no matter how politically unpopular they may be.
Congress should not have to enact reminders of this core regulatory
duty.
IV. Limited But Essential Statutory and Regulatory Remedies
A. Congress Should Act
Although the FCC does not need a new congressional mandate to
specify its duty to compile data and disclose statistics about the
current state of the telecommunications and information
marketplace, the Commission does need statutory guidance
elsewhere. In light of the reversal of the FCC's attempt to stretch its
104. See FED COMMC'NS COMM'N, PEER REVIEW AGENDA, (2010).
105. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 231 (2008)(holding
that the FCC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act by redacting studies
on which it relied in promulgating rules and when the Commission failed to provide a
reasoned explanation for its choice of an extrapolation factor for predicting how quickly
broadband over powerline emissions attenuate).
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jurisdiction to impose nondiscrimination and other responsibilities on
ISPs, Congress should amend the Communications Act to add a new
Title that creates a limited and specific set of regulatory requirements
applicable to Internet access providers. An explicit statutory
mandate would eliminate the false dichotomy created by the FCC to
differentiate telecommunications used to provide an information
service from telecommunications offered as a stand-alone service. In
both instances, the telecommunications facilities used are identical.
The FCC has rationalized a difference by choosing to apply the
telecommunications service classification when telecommunications is
offered, while applying the information service when telecom-
munications is provided as an integral, but apparently unseverable
part of an information service.
Only Congress can amend the organic law specifying the scope of
FCC jurisdiction and identifying what services and providers of these
services are subject to Commission jurisdiction. Congress should
identify the telecommunications components that provide Internet
access to end users, among ISPs, and from content providers. Such
specificity would eliminate any question that the FCC has a lawful
duty to ensure that access to the Internet complies with the
traditional Title II obligations of nondiscrimination and transparency
even though ISPs, as information service providers, do not bear the
duty of providing universal service. A specific Title on Internet
Access would eliminate confusion about whether ISPs will be
reclassified as common carriers and subject to all the Title II
requirements.
In 2005, the FCC, as augmented by recent efforts, has identified
what minimum requirements ISPs should satisfy." These require-
ments collectively do not convert ISPs into telecom-munications
service providers, but show that because nondiscriminatory and open
Internet access has become essential to national welfare and is in the
public interest, the FCC should have explicit statutory authority to
safeguard consumers. In 2005 a unanimous FCC, led by a Republican
Chairman, identified four "Internet freedoms.""o'
The Commission articulated its support in terms of four principles
"to encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
106. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005).
107. Id.
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open and interconnected nature of public Internet."'" The four
principles are:
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet
content of their choice;
(2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement;
(3) consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal
devices that do not harm the network; and
(4) consumers are entitled to competition among network
providers, application and service providers, and content
providers.
Prior to the reversal of the FCC's sanctioning of Comcast for
meddling with subscriber traffic, the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry
("NOI") with an eye towards codifying the four so-called Internet
freedoms, plus an explicit requirement of nondiscrimination and
transparency."o The NOI sought to begin "an open, public process to
consider the adequacy of the current legal framework within which
the Commission promotes investment and innovation in, and protects
consumers of, broadband Internet service.""' The FCC posed three
primary questions, the answers of which would steer the Commission
to do one of the following: (1) to maintain the limited, if any,
regulatory foundation available from Title I; (2) to reclassify wired
Internet access-e.g., DSL and Cable Modem service-as
telecommunications services, subject to Title II, common carrier
regulation; or (3) to pursue a "Third Way," where the Commission
would target selective portions of Title II regulation solely to the
portions of Internet access that involves the actual connection using
telecommunications lines."2
108. Id. at 14988.
109. Id.
110. Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of Inquiry, 25 FCC Rcd.
7866, 7877 (June 17, 2010).
111. Id. at$ 1.
112. Id. at 1 2. "First addressing the wired service offered by telephone and cable
companies and other providers, we seek comment on whether our "information service"
classification of broadband Internet service remains adequate to support effective
performance of the Commission's responsibilities. We then ask for comment on the legal
and practical consequences of classifying Internet connectivity service as a
"telecommunications service" to which all the requirements of Title II of the
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The FCC's NOI strongly implied that the Commission's
management objects to the D.C. Circuit Court's analysis and still
believes that Internet access "networks are within the Commission's
subject-matter jurisdiction over communications by wire and radio
and historically have been supervised by the Commission."" 3  The
NOI stated that until the Comcast decision, few observers doubted
whether the Commission had lawful authority to regulate broadband
*114Internet services.
The FCC devoted substantial space in the NOI reasserting why it
has a direct statutory authority to regulate Internet access. The
Commission persists in making possible inferences to statutory
language containing no specific regulatory mandate:
Throughout the last decade, the Commission has stated its
consistent understanding that Title I provided the
Commission adequate authority to support effective
performance of its core responsibilities. Commissioners,
including the two former Chairmen who urged the
information service approach, as well as cable and telephone
companies and other interested parties, individually expressed
this understanding. In Brand X, the Supreme Court appeared
to confirm this widely held view, stating that "the Commission
remains free to impose special regulatory duties on facilities-
based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction.',n
The FCC did acknowledge that the Comcast decision "causes [it]
to reexamine [its] ability to rely on Title I as the legal basis for
Communications Act would apply. Finally, we identify and invite comment on a third way
under which the Commission would: (i) reaffirm that Internet information services should
remain generally unregulated; (ii) identify the Internet connectivity service that is offered
as part of wired broadband Internet service (and only this connectivity service) as a
telecommunications service; and (iii) forbear under section 10 of the Communications Act
from applying all provisions of Title II other than the small number that are needed to
implement the fundamental universal service, competition and small business opportunity,
and consumer protection policies that have received broad support." Id.
113. Id. at 1 10. See also, Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of
Inquiry Powerpoint, FED. COMMC'N COMM'N (June 17, 2010), available athttp://reboot.
fcc.gov/c/document-1ibrary/getfile?uuid=366e0dc4-c4ef-4525-bc36-
d6a8dd75da4e&groupld=19001.
114. Id. at 8. "Before the Comcast case, most stakeholders-including major
communications service providers-shared the Commission's view that the information
service classification allowed the Commission to exercise jurisdiction over broadband
Internet services when required."
115. Id. at 1 30 (citations omitted).
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implementing broadband policies."" 6  In the wake of that decision,
the Commission accordingly asked what overall scope of authority
remains available if the Commission should retain the information
service classification for Internet access.
The FCC's second regulatory alternative considered a
reclassification of Internet access so that all aspects of Title II
common carrier regulatory could apply and enable the Commission
to establish "rules furthering universal service, privacy, access for
persons with disabilities, and basic consumer protection, among other
federal policies."". ISPs universally oppose this option, claiming that
it would impose unnecessary regulatory burdens and create
disincentives for investment in infrastructure and expanded hiring.
The FCC offered a third alternative which proposes to fine-tune
the scope of Title II coverage, limiting it to the telecommunications
links used to provide Internet access, while also having the
Commission forbear from applying all elements of common carrier
regulation. "This third way would involve classifying wired
broadband Internet connectivity as a telecommunications service . . .
but simultaneously forbearing from applying most requirements of
Title II to that connectivity service, save for a small number of
provisions.""' The Commission has applied this streamlined common
carrier model to wireless cellular telephone carriers, under an explicit
statutory mandate.
Chairman Genachowski and his staff have expressed a clear
preference for this Third Way option.11 However, even with the
immediate and extensive forbearance from regulation, this option
116. Id.
117. Id. at 52.
118. Id. at 67. "Specifically, if the Commission decided, after appropriate analysis,
to classify wired broadband Internet connectivity (and no other component of wired
broadband Internet service) as a telecommunications service, it could simultaneously
forbear from applying all but a handful of core statutory provisions-sections 201, 202,
208, and 254-to the service. Two other provisions that have attracted longstanding and
broad support in the broadband context-sections 222 and 255-might also be
implemented for the connectivity service, perhaps after the Commission provides
guidance in subsequent proceedings as to how they will apply in this context." Id. at 68.
119. Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored
Broadband Framework (May 6, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatchlDOC-297944A1.doc (rejecting a renewed attempt to find a way to extend
Title I ancillary jurisdiction or reclassifying Internet access as a telecommunications
service); Austin Schlick, FCC General Counsel, A Third-Way Legal Framework for
Addressing the Comcast Dilemma (May 6, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatchlDOC-297945A1.doc (providing legal rationale for narrow
application of selected sections of Title II regulatory authority over Internet access).
20111 243
entails a re-classification of statutory service definitions. Shifting
from information service to telecommunication service, which is
subject to regulatory forbearance, vests greater regulatory authority
in the FCC. Stakeholders and reviewing courts welcome
reclassifications that result in less regulatory authority and
commensurately less regulation. In effect, the Third Way option re-
regulates a service that either never qualified for regulation (e.g.,
cable modem information service) or had previously qualified for
deregulation (e.g., DSL service), that the FCC initially classified as a
telecommunications service, but later reclassified as an information
service.
Should the FCC adopt and apply the Third Way option, or rely on
Section 706 and other portions of the Communications Act, the
Commission will have explicitly stated that ISPs, like cellular
telephone companies, trigger two or more regulatory classifications
when offering a retail service. The Commission has evidenced a
preference for applying a single, least regulatory classification to
convergent services. When obligated to apply two or more
classifications, as currently applies to wireless telephone calls, Title II
common carriage, and wireless Internet access, Title I information
service, jointly provided by cellular telephone companies, the
Commission largely defaults to the less regulatory classification.
Nevertheless carriers subject to even the prospect of triggering a
potentially more expansive regulatory regime have launched a costly
campaign to convince Congress to prohibit the FCC from
undertaking a Third Way reclassification of Internet access.
Even as DSL and cable modem service providers act to prevent
the Commission from considering a reclassification of service,
curiously no one disputed the FCC's jurisdiction and authority to
sanction the Madison River Telephone Company when the company
blocked DSL subscriber access to VoIP services. 20 The matter
resulted in a voluntary forfeiture of fifteen thousand by the company
instead of litigation, without a complete examination of which
obligations the company had in its capacity as both an ISP and
common carrier vis a vis information services provided by a
competitor. 121
However, the Commission did expressly state that it reserved the
option of reviewing any complaints against the company-
presumably retroactively and prospectively-under its authority in
120. Madison River Commc'n, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005).
121. Id. at 4297.
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Sec. 208 (Title II) of the Communications Act.122 Madison River
provides some basis for FCC intervention to safeguard the public
interest and assert jurisdiction over the telecommunications links
used to provide DSL Internet access. However, a far better option
would be to have Congress explicitly identify the scope of FCC
jurisdiction over the telecommunications links used to provide
Internet access.
B. Regulatory Remedies in the Absence of New Legislation
In the absence of receiving explicit statutory authority for limited
regulation of Internet access, the FCC will attempt to fashion a
remedy, albeit one subject to litigation and delay. If the FCC has to
seek reform without legislative guidance the Commission has to
develop the capability for subjecting convergent ICE ventures to
multiple regulatory classifications and to use structural safeguards as
needed.
1. CMRS Hybrid Regulation
Congress has provided the FCC with one hybrid regulatory model
authorizing the Commission to deviate from applying the complete
array of Title II statutory requirements on wireless Commercial
Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") providers. 2 While this model only
allows modification of a single regulatory model, telecommunications
service and Title II common carriage requirements, the model does
provide the basis for the FCC to undertake empirical research with an
eye toward determining what regulatory reform appears necessary.
The CMRS model authorizes the FCC to streamline Title II
requirements based on a current assessment of the competitive
posture of the wireless marketplace. More broadly, the CMRS model
provides some basis for the FCC to consider what to do when
changed circumstances alter the array of services provided by a
regulated carrier and the degree of competition the carrier faces.
The Commission has deemed the wireless market sufficiently
competitive to justify abandonment of many Title II requirements,
while also acknowledging that CMRS carriers provide information
services not at all subject to Title II. Wireless carriers do not have to
file tariffs and comply with other regulatory burdens, even as they still
must interconnect with other carriers, provide access to "roaming"
122. Id. at 4298.
123. See supra note 24.
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subscribers of other carriers,12 ensure free 911 emergency access,12
and maintain number portability. 12 6  While the FCC appears to
overemphasize CMRS carriers' unregulated information service
capabilities, at least the Commission is able to identify a carrier
triggering two separate regulatory regimes, and to some extent
calibrate the scope of its regulatory oversight based on whether the
CMRS carrier provides a telecommunications or information service.
2. Eliminate the Provide/Offer Distinction
Although the FCC cannot subject information service providers
to Title II regulation, the Commission should eliminate one of the
false rationales used by the Supreme Court to justify a vast
information service safe harbor for Internet access services. The
Commission should explicitly recognize that the telecom-munications
technologies and facilities used to provide end user
telecommunications and to provide the links needed for Internet
access are identical. If such facilities are functional equivalents, then
it makes no sense to apply two different regulatory regimes. Over
time, reviewing courts might accept an FCC initiative to reclassify
124. Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
25 FCC Rcd. 4181(2010); Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
22 FCC Rcd. 15817 (2007); Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial
Mobile Radio Service Providers, WT Docket No. 05-265, Memorandum Opinion & Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 15047 (2005); Interconnection and
Resale Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket No. 94-
54, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd.
9462, 9468-69 1 10 (1996)(rules codified at 47 C.F.R. § 20.12(c)).
125. Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
Emergency Calling Systems, CC Docket No. 94-102, RM-8143, Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Red. 18676 (1996) (adopting
amendments to Section 20.3 and new Section 20.18 in the Commission's Rules, 47 C.F.R.
§§ 20.3, 20.18, on recon., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 22665 (1997)
Second Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 10954 (E911 Second Report and Order) (adopting
47 C.F.R. § 22.921 of the Commission's Rules). Third Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd.
17388 (1999); see also In the Matter of Implementation of the Net 911 Improvement Act
of 2008, WC Docket No. 08-171, Report and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 15884 (2008).
126. In the Matter of Telephone Number Portability, CC Docket No. 95-116, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 8352 (1996)
(establishing deadlines for wired and wireless telephone companies to enable new
subscribers to use preexisting telephone numbers when changing carriers); Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association's Petition for Forbearance From Commercial
Mobile Radio Services Number Portability Obligations, et al, WT Docket No. 98-229, CC
Docket No. 95-116, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 3092 (1999) (wireless
compliance deadline extended); Verizon Wireless's Petition for Partial Forbearance From
Commercial Mobile Radio Services Number Portability Obligation and Telephone
Number Portability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd. 14972, 14986, [ 31
(2002)(discussing further extension of compliance deadline).
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Internet access, not as an after the fact rationale, but in light of
changed circumstances.
If the Commission were to eliminate the technological basis it
used to support divergent regulatory treatment, then perhaps a
reviewing court would accept the Commission's premise that Internet
access has become such an essential service as to no longer qualify for
unconditional deregulation. Bear in mind that the FCC converted
DSL service from a regulated classification to an unregulated one
based on changed circumstances. As politically difficult as it may be
to re-regulate, the FCC should eliminate the invalid rationale for
justifying a false regulatory dichotomy between identical technologies
used to provide both telecommunications and information services.
Despite having reclassified DSL as an information service,
without challenge the FCC sanctioned a DSL service provider that
deliberately blocked subscriber access to an Internet-mediated
service. No party objected to the Commission's view that a telephone
company provider of DSL Internet access should not exploit its
largely unregulated status to engage in an unreasonable and
anticompetitive practice. No one sought to invoke the information
service classification as foreclosing the FCC from securing a
commitment from an integrated telephone company or ISP to refrain
from abusing its position as gateway to the Internet.
V. Conclusions
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of the FCC's attempt
to sanction Comcast's unwarranted meddling of subscriber traffic is
the latest of several instances where the FCC has to face the
consequences of abdicating regulatory oversight. Having applied the
information services deregulatory safe harbor to every form of
broadband Internet access, the FCC made a summary determination
that such services require no regulatory oversight. The Commission
attempted to corroborate this conclusion with questionable statistics
showing the robust competitiveness of broadband markets and the
ubiquity of access to such services by all Americans wherever located.
The FCC has subsequently recanted such summary conclusions
and belatedly come to recognize the need to impose some consumer
safeguards in the information services marketplace. But making a
case for the essentialness of broadband access, and generating
statistics that show less than ideal marketplace conditions cannot
undo the careless decision to stretch the information service
classification far and wide. The Commission cannot now "find" a
direct or even permissibly indirect statutory mandate to impose
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minimal Title II safeguards to services providers not offering Title II
telecommunications services. Only Congress can give the FCC such
authority.
It is likely that Congress will not pass curative legislation
providing the FCC with direct statutory authority to establish binding
rules promoting nondiscriminatory Internet access on fair terms and
conditions. Once freed of pesky common carrier regulations, ISPs
have aggressively lobbied Congress to maintain the deregulatory
status quo. Accordingly, the FCC will have to determine whether and
how it can impose any structural separation of telecommunications
and information services and other forms of regulatory oversight
based on existing and indirect statutory authority.
The Commission again risks overstepping its authority, but can
make its best case for acting under changed circumstances if it
resolves to do a better job of collecting, disseminating, and analyzing
data. This article has identified a number of ways in which the
Commission can generate a more complete evidentiary record that
identifies the true current environment instead of the one
Commission's managers want to see. With greater clarity in its
mission to serve the public interest, rather than achieve a
preordained, deregulatory outcome, the Commission may once again
convince reviewing courts that it is worthy of deference to its lawfully
recognized expertise and statutory analysis.
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